Abstract. The assumption that detection and/or state-preparation devices used for continuousvariable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) are beyond influence of potential eavesdroppers leads to a significant performance enhancement in terms of achievable key rate and transmission distance. We provide a detailed and comprehensible derivation of the Holevo bound in this so-called trusted-device scenario. Modelling an entangling-cloner attack and using some basic algebraic matrix transformations, we show that the computation of the Holevo bound can be reduced to the solution of a quadratic polynomial. As an advantage of our derivation, the mathematical complexity of our solution does not increase with the number of trusted-noise sources. Finally, we provide a numerical evaluation of our results, illustrating the counter-intuitive fact that an appropriate amount of trusted receiver loss and noise can even be beneficial for the key rate.
Introduction
In contrast to quantum key distribution with discrete variables (polarisation, phase or time-bin of single photons), continuous-variable QKD exploits the encoding of the position and momentum quadrature of weak coherent states [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Since coherent states can be both reliably produced at high rates and efficiently measured using standard coherent detection, CV-QKD is valued for its modest technological requirements. Our recent review article [1] provides a detailed introduction into the mathematical tools and methods required for the security analysis, noise-modelling and parameter estimation in CV-QKD. The so-called trusted-device scenario, however, is only mentioned briefly and incompletely in the above mentioned review. The present manuscript is a supplement to [1] which tries to compensate for this shortcoming.
We start with some preliminaries and definitions: Although in practical implementations of CV-QKD, the transmitter (Alice, A) will prepare randomly distributed coherent states with a modulation variance V mod using electro-optic modulation, the standard security analysis assumes that the transmitter and the receiver (Bob, B) share a sequence of two-mode-squeezed vacuum states (or EPR states) with variance V = V mod +1 (in shot-noise units, SNU). Alice who generates these EPR states in her lab keeps one mode to herself to perform a heterodyne measurement on and transmits the other one to Bob through an insecure quantum channel. We further assume that an eavesdropper's (Eve, E) attack on the quantum channel causes a disturbance in Bob's mode in the shape of an additional quadrature variance, labelled as channel excess noise ξ ch , and an attenuation, labelled as channel transmittance T ch . Bob, using imperfect measurement devices, will experience further noise and attenuation which we label as ξ rec and T rec . The receiver noise ξ rec might be composed of the electronic noise of the homodyne detector(s), quantisation errors caused by analogue-to-digital conversion of the measurement outcomes, phase-and intensity noise of the local oscillator and others. The receiver transmission T rec is the product of the detection and coupling efficiency in Bob's lab. In the trusted-receiver scenario, ξ rec and T rec are well-known and calibrated and assumed to be beyond influence of potential eavesdroppers.
Contrary to the more common notation in CV-QKD literature where the channel noise refers to the channel input, we define it referring to the channel output, as received by Bob: ξ ch := T ch ξ ch,A = ξ ch,B /T rec , where ξ ch,A is the channel noise referring to Alice and ξ ch,B is the channel noise as measured by Bob. The measured variance of Bob's quadratures is T tot (V − 1) + 1 + ξ tot where T tot = T ch T rec and ξ tot = T rec ξ ch + ξ rec or, in the presence of preparation noise (discussed in Section 3.3), ξ tot = T tot ξ pr + T rec ξ ch + ξ rec .
In continuous-variable quantum key distribution the lower bound on the asymptotic secure-key rate for reverse reconciliation, assuming collective attacks, is described by [1, 6] 
where f sym is the symbol rate, FER is the frame-error rate during error correction, ν is the fraction of the raw key consumed by parameter estimation, β is the reconciliation efficiency, I AB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob and χ EB is an upper bound for the mutual information between Eve and Bob, also referred to as Holevo bound. In the case of Gaussian modulation of coherent states the mutual information between Alice and Bob reads [1]
where T tot is the total attenuation (channel and detection), V is the variance of the two-mode-squeezed vacuum state (in SNU) that Alice and Bob share, ξ tot is the total excess noise as measured by Bob (in SNU) and µ indicates whether homodyne detection (measurement of q or p; µ = 1) or heterodyne detection (simultaneous measurement of q and p; µ = 2) is performed. The Holevo bound of a CV-QKD system with reverse reconciliation is the difference between Eve's von Neumann entropy S before and after Bob performed a projective quadrature measurement:
In general, the von Neumann entropy is computed using
where ν i are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrices that describe the information accessible to Eve. In this paper we discuss two approaches to model the impact of trusted devices on the Holevo bound: one ansatz based on the purification method and one ansatz based on the entangling-cloner attack, both illustrated in Fig. 1 . Both are equivalent and lead to the same results due to the freedom in purification, as explained in [1] . Assuming a trusted receiver, we show that the former approach requires to find the eigenvalues of a 6 × 6 matrix whereas in the latter approach the problem is reduced to a 4 × 4 matrix. Using some basic algebraic matrix transformations, we show that the eigenvalue problem of the entangling-cloner attack can be further reduced to a 2 × 2 matrix, allowing for analytic expressions of manageable complexity. Furthermore, as elaborated in Section 3.3, our approach reduces the mathematical complexity even more drastically in a trusted-receiver and -preparation scenario.
Purification ansatz
This approach assumes that Eve possesses a purification of Alice's and Bob's mutual state ρ AB such that
and ρ ABE = |ψ ABE ψ ABE | is pure. Since for a pure bipartite state the entropy in both subsystems is the same, we have S E = S AB , and S AB is obtained from the symplectic eigenvalues of a covariance matrix of the form
If the entire transmission T and excess noise ξ are attributed to Eve, the parameters above comprise both the contributions from the channel as well as from the receiver, i.e. T = T ch T rec and ξ = T rec ξ ch + ξ rec , where ξ ch is the channel noise as received by Bob. Figure 1 : Two different approaches to compute S E and S E|B in the trusted-receiver assumption. The purification ansatz (a) does not make any assumptions on the particular eavesdropping attack. Eve's interaction with the quantum channel will modify the initial quantum state to (7) . The trusted receiver is modelled by an additional two-mode squeezed vacuum state interacting with Bob's mode. The total state therefore comprises four optical modes (star-shaped red sparks). A measurement of Bob's mode will reduce the total state to three modes, described by a 6 × 6 covariance matrix. Eve is not directly represented in this matrix. Since we assume her to hold a purification of Alice's and Bob's state, her conditional entropy S E|B equals the one of the remaining total state. In the entangling-cloner ansatz (b), both the detector and the channel are modelled with additional EPR states. The total state now comprises six optical modes before and five modes after Bob's projective measurement. As opposed to the purification ansatz, Eve is now represented in the total state by her own state EPR ch . In order to compute her entropy it is sufficient to compute the eigenvalues of her subsystem, represented by a 4 × 4 matrix (as opposed to a 6 × 6 matrix in the purification ansatz). We show below how this problem can be even further reduced to dimension 2 × 2.
Under the relaxed assumption that the detection devices in Bob's lab are well calibrated and trusted, T rec and ξ rec are beyond Eve's influence and the covariance matrix describing her von Neumann entropy before Bob's measurement reads
Depending on whether the receiver is assumed to be trusted or not, Eves entropy S E will be computed using the matrix (7) or (6) . Since both matrices are of the form
their symplectic eigenvalues can be obtained by [7] 
Inserting ν 1 and ν 2 into (4) yields Eve's von Neumann entropy S E . Although in the trusted-receiver model T rec and ξ rec do not contribute to S E , they still influence Bob's measurement and therefore also Eve's entropy conditioned on Bob's measurement. The computation of S E|B is therefore a bit more elaborate than just omitting T rec and ξ rec in the calculations. The purification-based approach to compute S E|B with a trusted receiver, which is in more detail described in [8] [9] [10] , assumes an unspecified eavesdropper attack on the quantum channel leading to the covariance matrix (7) . The imperfect detection is modelled by mixing Bob's mode of the shared EPR state (7) with an additional EPR state using a beamsplitter of transmittance T rec in Bob's lab, as illustrated in Fig. 1(a) . The total state therefore consists of four optical modes and is represented by an 8 × 8 matrix. A projective quadrature measurement of Bob's mode will reduce the total state to three modes, i.e. a 6 × 6 covariance matrix labelled as Σ tot|B . Depending on whether Bob performs heterodyne or homodyne detection, this state is given by [1] Σ tot|B (het) = Σ A,rec − 1
where Σ A,rec ∈ R 6×6 describes the submatrix representing Alice's half of the initial EPR pair and the EPR pair used to model the imperfect receiver, Σ C ∈ R 6×2 is the submatrix describing the quadrature correlations of Σ A,rec with Bob's mode, V B is Bob's quadrature variance and Π is a projection operator defined as
In the projected state Σ tot|B there are no optical modes attributed to Eve. The three remaining modes are inaccessible to her. However, assuming that she purifies the total state, it is sufficient to know the entropy of Σ tot|B in order to obtain S E|B since it coincides with Eve's entropy. This is analogous to the computation of S E where knowledge of the matrix (6) (untrusted receiver) or (7) (trusted receiver) allows for the derivation of Eve's entropy before the projective measurement. The matrix Σ tot|B is of dimension 6 × 6 but can be rearranged into a block-diagonal representation of two equivalent 3 × 3 matrices using similarity transformations analogous to the ones described in the subsequent section. The eigenvalue problem can thereby be reduced to a cubic polynomial.
Entangling-cloner ansatz
This ansatz has been previously described in [1, 11] , however only for the scenario of an untrusted receiver. In this approach the trusted-receiver scenario can be modelled as follows: The total state now consists of three EPR states (see Fig. 1(b) ) which are each uniquely defined by their variance: one used for key exchange by Alice and Bob with variance V , one modelling noise and loss in the quantum channel with variance W ch and one modelling receiver noise and loss with variance W rec . Beamsplitters, one with transmission T ch and one with transmission T rec mix Bob's mode of the initial EPR state with the respective two others. The total state before action of the beamsplitters can be represented by the covariance matrix
which can be more handily written in terms of the the direct sum:
The channel beamsplitter acts on Bob's mode and the first mode of the channel EPR state; the receiver beamsplitter acts on Bob's mode and the first mode of the receiver EPR state:
Labelling the subsequent action of both beamsplitters as BS tot = BS rec BS ch , the total quantum state transforms as follows:
We omit writing down the resulting 12 × 12 matrix which is rather bulky and little illuminating. Instead, we first concentrate on the subsystem shared by Alice and Bob, i.e. the first two rows and columns of Σ tot (four if the block matrices 1 2 and σ z are expanded):
Now, defining the variances of the EPR states such that
the variance of Bob's mode becomes
and the covariance matrix (16) reads
which is consistent with (6).
On the other hand, extracting from Σ tot the two modes belonging to Eve, we obtain
This matrix is of the shape (8), and therefore its symplectic eigenvalues can be computed by (9) . As can be verified, its entropy S E coincides with the one shared by Alice and Bob, obtained from their mutual covariance matrix under loose assumptions (7) which is exactly what we expect to see when Eve holds a purification of Alice's and Bob's state:
Now, in order to obtain S E|B we first need to compute Σ tot|B , hence the total state of the remaining modes after a projective measurement of Bob's mode. We first rearrange Σ tot such that Bob's mode is represented in the last row and column. This can be done using the permutation matrix
which will permute the third and fourth row (column) to the bottom (right) when multiplied with Σ tot from the front (back):
Since P 3,4→11,12 P T 3,4→11,12 = 1, the above permutation is a similarity transformation and therefore leaves the eigenvalues of Σ tot invariant. The rearranged matrix is now of the form
where Σ A,ch,rec ∈ R 10×10 describes Alice's mode and the two EPR states modelling the channel and the receiver, Σ B ∈ R 2×2 is Bob's mode and Σ C ∈ R 10×2 describes the mutual quadrature correlations between Σ A,ch,rec and Σ B . The partial matrix after a projective measurement of Bob's mode depends on whether Bob performs heterodyne or homodyne detection.
Heterodyne detection
In the case of heterodyne detection of Bob's mode, the remaining modes are projected into the state described by the 10 × 10 matrix
Again, it is not necessary to evaluate the entire resulting matrix. Instead we only calculate the block matrix that describes Eve's information, i.e. the two modes representing the EPR state that was used to model the channel noise and transmission. This matrix reads
with
and V B is given by (18). Since the above matrix Σ E|B is again of the form (8) we obtain the symplectic eigenvalues ν 3 and ν 4 by using (9):
As can be verified, this result coincides with the one from [9] which was obtained using the purification ansatz.
Homodyne detection
In the case of homodyne detection of Bob's mode, the remaining modes are projected into the state
As in the heterodyne case, we extract from this matrix the two modes controlled by Eve, described by the submatrix Σ E|B . Depending on whether a q-or p-measurement has been performed, Eve's state after homodyne measurement of Bob's mode reads: 
Since a projective homodyne measurement affects the q-and p-quadratures of the remaining modes differently, Σ E|B has now to be described by six independent components, as opposed to only three components in the case of heterodyne detection. Moreover, as this matrix is not similar to (8), we need to compute the symplectic eigenvalues by hand. Now, the symplectic eigenvalues of Σ E|B are the positive eigenvalues of iΩ 2 Σ E|B where
This leads to the expression (depending on whether a q-or p-measurement has been performed) 
The matrix Σ E|B,sympl (p) is related to the transpose of Σ E|B,sympl (q) by the similarity transformation
and therefore has the same eigenvalues. Thus, we can omit the separate consideration of q-and p-measurement in the following derivation. We now square Σ E|B,sympl (q) (keeping in mind that that the eigenvalues of a squared matrix are just its squared eigenvalues): 
The advantage of squaring Σ E|B,sympl (q) is that the above matrix can now be brought into a block-diagonal form by rearranging the rows and columns. In particular, swapping the second and third column using the permutation matrix
yields the expression
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(Since P 2↔3 P 2↔3 = 1 the operation above is another similarity transformation and therefore does not affect the eigenvalues.) The eigenvalues of a block-diagonal matrix are the union of the eigenvalues of the individual blocks. This particular problem is even more simplified by the observation that the two blocks of each matrix are transposes of each other and therefore have the same eigenvalues. So the whole problem is reduced to finding the eigenvalues of one 2 × 2 matrix. The square root of these eigenvalues represents the eigenvalues of Σ E|B,sympl and therefore the symplectic eigenvalues of Σ E|B that we need for computation of S E|B . What we get is
Again, these results are equivalent to the ones obtained by the purification ansatz [8, 9] .
Trusted preparation noise
The above derivation of the Holevo bound is particularly handy when not only receiver loss and noise but also preparation noise is considered to be trusted [10] . Preparation noise may be composed of laser phase noise and imperfect quadrature modulation. Similar to the channel and receiver noise, we model the preparation noise using an additional two-mode-squeezed state EPR pr [12] with variance
where ξ pr is the preparation noise in shot-noise units as produced by Alice. The preparation noise as measured by Bob will then be ξ pr,B = T ch T rec ξ pr . One mode of EPR pr will be interfered with Bob's mode using a beamsplitter of transmission T pr → 1 (since imperfect preparation does, in contrast to the channel and receiver, not introduce optical attenuation). Although the limit T pr → 1 will lead to W pr → ∞, the mode reflected into the channel will be (1 − T pr )W pr = ξ pr + 1 − T pr → ξ pr and is therefore finite and well-defined. Figure 2: Security analysis under trusted receiver and state preparation using (a) the purification and (b) the entangling-cloner ansatz. The trusted preparation noise is modelled by an additional two-modesqueezed state EPR pr with variance W pr = ξ pr /(1 − T pr ) + 1 and a beamsplitter with transmission T pr → 1. Although the total state is extended by two additional modes, the mathematical complexity of the security analysis using the entangling-cloner ansatz does not increase significantly since we still only compute the eigenvalues of Eve's subsystem (represented by a 4 × 4 matrix which can again be reduced to dimension 2 × 2 using the transformations described above).
Using the purification ansatz, the entropy S E has to be obtained by the symplectic eigenvalues of a 12 × 12 matrix, describing 6 optical modes: Alice's and Bob's modes and the two modes of W pr and W rec , respectively (see Fig. 2(a) ). Computation of S E|B requires the symplectic eigenvalues of a 10×10 matrix, describing 5 optical modes, i.e. the total state minus Bob's mode which was measured by heterodyne or homodyne detection. Finding the eigenvalues of this matrix is therefore related to solving a fifth-degree polynomial.
In contrast, using the derivation based on the entangling-cloner attack analogous to the previous section, the problem can again be remodelled to an investigation of merely the two modes accessible to Eve (see Fig. 2(b) ), reducing the eigenvalue problem to a second-degree polynomial. This allows us to describe trusted preparation and detection noise by analytical expressions of limited complexity.
The total initial state now includes the EPR state responsible for preparation noise:
The total beamsplitting operator is now BS tot = BS rec BS ch BS pr . After the transformation
we extract the block matrix describing Eve's modes and set T pr = 1. This yields
which, consistently, is identical to (20) after the substitution V → V + ξ pr . The symplectic eigenvalues ν 1 and ν 2 needed for S E are again obtained by (9) . In order to compute ν 3 and ν 4 , as required for S E|B , we again build the partial covariance matrix of the total state after a projective heterodyne (10a) or homodyne (10b) measurement of Bob's mode and then extract the block matrix describing Eve's modes. After setting T pr = 1 Eve's covariance matrix conditioned on Bob's measurement is of the form (26) in the case of heterodyne detection and of the form (30) in the case of homodyne detection. Moreover the elements of Σ E|B,het and Σ E|B,hom are identical to (27) (heterodyne) and (31) (homodyne) except for the substitution V → V + ξ pr . The symplectic eigenvalues ν 3 and ν 4 are again obtained by (28) (heterodyne), or by (38) (homodyne), respectively. Numerical evaluation of our analytical equations yields a convincing accordance with the numerical results obtained by the purification ansatz [10] . 
Numerical evaluation
Using our CV-QKD simulation tool 'CVsim' [13] , we were able to conduct a thorough study of trusted receiver and state preparation and their implication on experimental implementations. Figure 3 indicates the performance difference in terms of the achievable key rate and channel length depending on whether preparation and/or receiver are trusted. Figures 4(a) and (b) illustrate the key rate with respect to trusted receiver noise and loss, parametrised by channel noise and channel length. Interestingly, these graphs exhibit a non-monotonous behaviour, indicating that the trusted-receiver assumption does not only render device imperfections less harmful; even more, trusted receiver loss and noise can actually be used to increase the key rate [14] . This is possible when T rec and ξ rec decrease the Holevo information χ EB more than they decrease the mutual information I AB . This effect, sometimes described by 'fighting noise with noise' [10] is only possible in the trusted-receiver scenario where imperfect detection increases the conditional entropy S E|B but leaves the entropy S E invariant. Figure 5 illustrates the secure-key rate with respect to trusted and untrusted preparation noise for different channel lengths.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we demonstrated and derived in detail an efficient way to compute the Holevo bound in continuousvariable quantum key distribution under the assumption of trusted receiver and state preparation. In particular, we showed that the eigenvalue problem that needs to be solved in order to obtain the Holevo bound can be reduced to a second-degree polynomial, regardless of the total system's complexity. This allowed us to find analytical expressions for Eve's entropy and conditional entropy under the assumption of trusted receiver and state preparation. Finally, we performed numerical simulations to illustrate the impact of various trusted-device assumptions on practical CV-QKD implementations, highlighting the fact that under particular circumstances the key rate can even be increased by an appropriate amount of trusted receiver loss and noise. 
